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DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1972
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),1 which was enacted
in 1966, completely amended the "Public Information" section of
the Administrative Procedure Act.2  Until the amendment, the APA
had been regarded as a withholding statute rather than a disclosure
statute.3 The FOIA establishes a pattern of full agency disclosure
unless the information sought is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language, and provides a procedure by which citizens and
the press may obtain information wrongfully withheld.4 Congres-
sional hearings conducted in 19725 represent the first detailed re-
view of agency performance under the FOIA. As a result of those
hearings, the House Committee on Government Operations con-
cluded that many agencies either had failed to comply or had de-
layed in complying with the provisions of the Act.7 This recalcitrant
attitude on the part of the federal agencies is reflected in the large
volume of FOIA litigation in 1972.
TRADITIONAL EQUITY POWERS AND THE FOIA
Although much litigation under the FOIA8 has dealt with de-
lineation of specific exemptions, there have also been significant cases
exploring the existence and extent of the traditional equity powers
available to enforce the Act.9 Heretofore, the courts have not been
1. 5 U.&C. § 552 (1970).
2. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
3. HousE COMMITTE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972);
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1965).
4. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 3.
5. The hearings are reported in: Hearings on U.S. Government Information
Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. pts. 4-8 (1972).
6. 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 4.
7. Id. at 8-11.
8. An action for disclosure is permitted under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
9. Those decisions which most nearly approach the issue are concerned with
the existence of equitable discretion to refuse enforcement in FOIA cases when the
material sought is found or conceded not to come within a specific exemption.
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required to decide whether the Act allows the exercise of equitable
power to enjoin an ongoing administrative proceeding pending dis-
position of an FOIA claim concerning records relevant to that ad-
ministrative proceeding.
In Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Board,10 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the grant-
ing of temporary injunctions enjoining administrative proceedings.
The court held, in a decision encompassing three cases in which the
Renegotiation Board'1 had decided to proceed with renegotiation of
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1969), that district courts could exercise their equitable discretion in con-
sidering whether to order production of documents not exempt from the Act's dis-
closure requirements. Id. at 880. A similar result was reached in Consumers
Union v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363
(2d Cir. 1971). For a discussion of this case, see 1971 Duke Project 144-45.
However, a statement with contrary implications was made by the Fourth Circuit
in Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971), and by the District of
Columbia Circuit in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and in Sou-
cie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum).
Several decisions in 1972 dealt with the equitable discretion question. The con-
flict of opinion, however, was intensified rather than resolved. See Long v. IRS,
349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972) (the pro-discretion statement of the Ninth
Circuit in GSA v. Benson, supra, was adopted); Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504
(D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 72-1328, D.C. Cir., April 11, 1972 (the court's
summary disposition of the case and its colorful quotation, id. at 506, indicate that
the court considered itself possessed of some kind of discretion). In Wu v. Na-
tional Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
41 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1973) the Fifth Circuit, in employing an in-
terest-balancing test, may have indicated a position favoring equitable discretion.
The opposite position was adopted in four cases. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1972), the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that material outside the exemption must be disclosed. In Hawkes v.
IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972) and Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v.
FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit rejected the possibility of equitable discretion. A concurrence by Judge
Miller in each case, 464 F.2d at 662, 467 F.2d at 797, refused to accept this
position. In Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1972), the
court cited Wellford v. Hardin, supra, for the proposition that equitable discretion
is not available.
By the end of 1972, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits had affirmed the existence
of equitable discretion while the Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits
had rejected it. Although many of these positions were taken only in dictum or by
implication, the opinions have been frequently cited, and the conflict is serious
enough to merit Supreme Court resolution.
10. 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S.
Jan. 22, 1973) (No. 72-822).
11. The Renegotiation Act empowers the Renegotiation Board to recover ex-
cessive profits made by defense contractors and subcontractors. 50 U.S.C. app.,
§ 1191(c) (1970). If a decision to renegotiate is reached, a detailed financial
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contracts,'- that the district court had acted correctly in enjoining
further agency proceedings13 pending final determination of FOIA
suits to force production of documents related to those agency pro-
ceedings.
In Bannercraft, after entry into the renegotiation process, the
plaintiffs had filed requests pursuant to the FOIA14 for certain doc-
uments. Subsequent to the Board's rejection of these requests, 5 the
contractors filed suit in the district court seeking to force release of
these documents.' 6 On appeal from the district court's grant of pre-
liminary injunctions against further renegotiation" pending its deci-
report is prepared and renegotiation begins. Id. § 1215(e) (1); 32 C.F.R. § 1470.3
(a) (1972). Renegotiation may be carried on through several steps culminating in
full Board proceedings at the contractor's option, but a de novo determination of
excess profits will be made at each level. 32 C.F.R. § 1472.3(d)-(f), (h)-(i),
.4(b) (1972). From the final order of the Board, the contractor has an appeal
of right to the Court of Claims, which again makes a de novo interpretation.
50 U.S.C.A. app., § 1218 (Supp. 1972). This decision is reviewable in the Su-
preme Court by writ of certiorari. Id. § 1218a. Thus, below the Court of Claims
level the contractor is under the implicit threat that, if he persists to the next level, a
determination of higher excessive profits may be imposed.
In Bannercraft, the court emphasized the minimal effect of its decision on
renegotiation, perhaps indicating that it saw no further implications of its decision.
466 F.2d at 361.
12. Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., No. 24,685; Astro Com-
munication Lab. v. Renegotiation Bd., No. 24,778; David B. Lilly Co. v. Renegotia-
tion Bd., No. 71-1025.
13. The proceedings enjoined were contract renegotiations between the Re-
negotiation Board and the contractors pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app., H9 1211-33
(1970).
14. The requests were filed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
15. The Board broadly claimed one or more of the exemptions contained in
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) to be applicable. 466 F.2d at 348.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970) provides, in part: "On complaint, the dis-
trict court of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from the complainant."
17. In No. 24,778 the Eastern Regional Board had made a tentative deter-
mination that Astro Communications Laboratory had received excessive profits.
A conference with the Eastern Regional Board personnel assigned to the case had
been held and a meeting with a panel of the Regional Board had been scheduled
when the district court issued the injunction. In No. 24,685, following Banner-
craft's appeal of determination of excessive profits by the Regional Board, the Re-
negotiation Board had announced its similar determination. The injunction pre-
vented the completion of the last stages of negotiation, a condition precedent to a
binding order. 32 C.F.R. § 1472.4(d) (1972). In No. 71-1025, personnel of the
Eastern Regional Board had informed the David B. Lilly Company that a recom-
mendation of an assessment for excessive profits would be made to the Regional
Board. The preliminary injunction was granted before Lilly had decided whether to
confer with the Regional Board. 466 F.2d at 351.
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sion on the merits on the FOIA claim, the court of appeals held
that the district court did have jurisdiction to issue the injunctions and
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not
bar such relief.'1
In finding equitable jurisdiction, the court relied upon case
precedents in which courts found the necessity to act, or to refrain
from acting, in order to enforce legislative intent. It is significant,
however, that the cases cited by the court provide only weak sup-
port for this conclusion.' 9 The court then reasoned that the FOIA
evidenced an intent to aid parties involved in agency proceedings
-a "subsidiary statutory purpose" 2 -and then found the power of
injunctive enforcement of that intention to be a necessary, albeit im-
plied, power granted by the Act.21  The court's reasoning in finding
the subsidiary statutory purpose, however, is also unpersuasive. 2
18. 466 F.2d at 354. The exhaustion doctrine is typified by the Supreme
Court's holding in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
In Myers, the Court held that an allegation by a party in an NLRB proceeding that
the Board had no jurisdiction over the question presented was not sufficient to in-
voke a district court's equity power to enjoin the NLRB proceeding, and that no
relief could be granted until the prescribed administrative remedy had been ex-
hausted. The exhaustion requirement, however, has never been absolute, and
many exceptions to the rule have developed. See McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185 (1969). The court in Bannercraft agreed with the following statement by
Professor Davis:
Despite the many absolute statements in judicial opinions that judicial
relief is withheld until administrative remedies have been exhausted, the
holdings show that exhaustion is sometimes required and sometimes not.
No opinion of the Supreme Court explains the contrariety of holdings
3 DAvis § 20.10, at 114, quoted in 466 F.2d at 355.
See JAF.E 426-27. See also pp. 275-300 infra. The requirement has been applied to
the renegotiation process. E.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948);
Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Macauley v. Water-
man S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946). None of these exceptions, however, had
been applied to the process before 1972.
19. 466 F.2d at 353. The cases cited for this proposition were: Clark v.
Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839), which involved a title dispute; Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), and Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. 288 (1960), which spoke directly to equitable discretion. Mitchell
squarely holds that powers necessary to legislative intent are available. These
cases can be easily distinguished, as the dissent in Bannercraft points out, 466 F.2d
at 364, because the statute construed therein included an express grant of jurisdic-
tion to issue "other order[s]." In contrast, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
20. 466 F.2d at 352. The court found evidence of this statutory purpose in
the Act itself, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (1970), and in the legislative history, S. RPp.
No. 813, supra note 3, at 7. But see 466 F.2d at 363 (dissenting opinion).
21. 466 F.2d at 354.
22. The language cited by the court, 466 F.2d at 352, indicates only that the
FOIA was intended in part to require that no "secret law" could be used by an
agency. The comments were directed at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (1970), which con-
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With respect to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs should be required to
exhaust administrative remedies only if doing so would be consist-
ent with the purposes underlying the exhaustion doctrine.23  An anal-
ysis of the exhaustion doctrine led the court to conclude that judicial
intervention was proper only. when: (1) irreparable injury to sub-
stantive rights is threatened;24 (2) no adequate remedy at law is
available through statutory modes of relief;2 5 and (3) the interven-
tion would not be in derogation of the agency's jurisdiction.2 0  The
court noted that the FOIA granted sole jurisdiction for enforcement
of FOIA claims to the federal district courts, and consequently, there
could be no proper grounds for asserting that the availability of a
legal remedy or the need to respect administrative jurisdiction re-
quired exhaustion. 2' The court stated that the possibility that the
companies would be forced to negotiate without information which
they had a right to obtain28 constituted a threat to a substantive
"statutory right. '29  Reasoning that renegotiation could not work
properly unless the information was supplied beforehand, the court
found an impending irreparable injury.30  Unfortunately, the court
neither clearly expressed its concept of the "irreparable injury" nor
described with particularity the "statutory right" threatened."'
The manner in which the Bannercraft court found equitable ju-
risdiction suggests that the applicability of the holding is not limited
cerns agency opinions, orders, and rules. See 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 7;
S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 6-7.
23. See 466 F.2d at 355.
24. Id. at 355-56.
25. Id. at 356 & n.9, 357-59.
26. Id. at 359-60.
27. "The plain fact is that there are no administrative remedies under the
Freedom of Information Act. Once a party has properly requested information
from an agency, he has exhausted all the administrative avenues of relief which the
act provides." Id. at 358; see id. at 360. Cf. Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871,
cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3502 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1973) (No. 72-403).
28. 466 F.2d at 356.
29. The court's opinion is somewhat vague as to the precise source of the
threatened "statutory right." The statement follows the court's reiteration of the
plaintiffs' asserted "need" for the documents to participate properly in the re-
negotiation process and their present inability to do so absent Board compliance
with the FOIA. Id. See note 11 supra.
30. 466 F.2d at 356. This case presented appeals from the granting of pre-
liminary injunctions. Therefore, the court "found" the irreparable injury based on
the assumption that all the facts were as the complaints alleged-an assumption of
facts which the trial court must make. Id.
31. See note 36 infra.
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to Renegotiation Board proceedings.32 Assuming that Congress, in
enacting the FOIA, intended to aid parties involved in agency pro-
ceedings by allowing the district courts to exercise their broad equi-
table power, Congress clearly did not require that this equitable
power be exercised only to stay renegotiation proceedings. Further-
more, in finding the exhaustion requirement inapplicable, the court
relied upon a similarly non-limiting argument with respect to "no
adequate remedy at law" and "respect for administrative jurisdic-
tion": that the Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to district courts for
all FOIA claims. 33 Therefore, the ultimate breadth of application
of the Bannercraft holding depends upon the interpretation of "ir-
reparable injury" and of the "statutory right" threatened. 4  The
injury found is referred to as a "clear threat to a statutory right,"35
-a notion apparently premised upon the unique nature of the stat-
utorily prescribed renegotiation process, which is based on the right
32. Other circuits have often been disinclined to follow the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's liberal interpretation of the FOA disclosure provisions. See text ac-
companying note& 164-75 infra. See also 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 70.
33. 466 F.2d at 360. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
34. An additional factor bearing upon the breadth of application of Bannercraft
will be the ultimate resolution of the apparent conflict between Bannercraft and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1970).
In Sears, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a district court
lacked jurisdiction to enjoin NLRB proceedings pending a final determination of an
action seeking disclosure of information under the FOIA. Finding that the injunc-
tion sought was not of the type authorized by the FOIA, the Sears court said:
Even assuming that the dubious proposition that Congress intended to
create an exception to its long-standing policy against enjoining the
Board, plaintiff seeks neither an injunction nor an order of the type de-
scribed above [referring to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970)]. We there-
fore conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction, since it does not have the power to enjoin or review
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 211 (emphasis
added).
Because the statutory language, legislative history, and prior decisions do not
clearly command either result, the correct resolution of this conflict is best ascer-
tained by considering the effects of a widespread following of Sears and Banner-
craft, respectively. If Sears is followed, the party engaged in an administrative
proceeding and denied information will be forced to litigate his FOIA action while
simultaneously continuing with the agency proceeding. If he is successful on his
FOIA disclosure claim, he might have grounds for reversal of an adverse adminis-
trative decision based on a "denial of fair and full hearing." The urging of such a
claim will necessitate the development of some standards for what constitutes depri-
vation of information sufficient for reversal, perhaps analogous to the "harmless
error" doctrine of the criminal law. The advantage of this solution, short-run ex-
pediency, would perhaps be outweighed by the ominous prospect of a remand to
the agency for a de novo administrative proceeding, which would be required where
the district court has ordered disclosure and the appellate court determines that
failure to make such disclosure constituted a "denial of fair and full hearing."
35. 466 F.2d at 356.
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to engage in meaningful negotiations during the non-reviewable,
multi-level de novo determinations."0 Therefore, even if Banner-
craft is not expressly limited to renegotiation proceedings, the hold-
ing would appear to be limited to administrative proceedings of an
analogous nature in which a binding non-reviewable agreement is
sought pursuant to statute.37 The typical adjudicatory proceeding,
where a court of review could remand an administrative decision
with an order to rehear the case after the desired information had
been disclosed, would not seem to be within the scope of the Ban-
nercraft decision.
Two cases in 1972 have applied the Bannercraft decision. In
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. FTC,38 the District Court for the
District of Columbia rejected a motion to enjoin FTC proceedings
pending the decision of an FOIA disclosurq action. The court
distinguished Bannercraft on two points: first, the FTC proceed-
ings involved no "informed negotiation"; second, the series of de
novo reviews seen in the renegotiation process were absent in the
FTC action. These distinctions, which are directed at the irreparable
injury requirement of Bannercraft, suggest that the Bannercraft hold-
ing might be given limited application.
36. See note 11 supra. Perhaps an indication that the decision should only
apply to renegotiation proceedings can be taken from the court's statement that:
Appellee's point is that the administrative process cannot function as it
was intended to function until they are given access to the documents
.... [Olur appellees would like to take advantage of the renegotiation
process, but claim an inability to do so effectively until the Board com-
plies with the Freedom of Information Act. 466 F.2d at 356.
A contrary indication, however, may be derived from the failure of the court
in Bannerceaft to use this point in distinguishing Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450
F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Sterling, the drug company requested certain
documents for preparation of its case before the FTC. The request was refused.
The company then brought an action to force production of those documents which
were denied at the district court level and on appeal. Id. at 710. The company
also included a complaint that failure to provide the documents would deny them
the full and fair hearing guaranteed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 et seq. (1970). The Sterling court never reached the merits of this latter
contention, however, because it found jurisdiction barred by the exhaustion require-
ment. 450 F.2d at 712. The court, in Bannercraft, distinguished Sterling in two
ways: first, because the Sterling request for an injunction was framed in due
process terms (not FOIA rights), 466 F.2d at 358; and second, because assumption
of jurisdiction would have necessitated a decision on a difficult constitutional ques-
tion, id. at n.10.
37. Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 2.31-2.35 (1972), the FTC consent order procedure under
the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1970). The desired disclosure should aid in
obtaining such agreement, however, rather than simply improving the litigational
strength of the private party in subsequent adjudication.
38. 31 A. L.2d 503 (D.D.C. 1972).
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In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB39 the District Court for the
District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction ° against NLRB
proceedings pending a decision on the merits of Sears' claim for
disclosure of memoranda prepared by the NLRB.4 1 Reaffirming
the district court's power to issue such an injunction, the court of
appeals nevertheless granted a summary reversal of .the injunc-
tion.42 The reversal was based upon Sears' failure to show that ir-
reparable injury might result from its failure to have the information
sought while participating as a charging party in the NLRB pro-
ceeding.4" The court based its finding of no irreparable injury on
two grounds: first, the Regional Board's attorney did have the doc-
uments available in his prosecution of the complaint;44 second, the
court stated that "an appropriate remedy can be fashioned by the
Board, or by the court of appeals with jurisdiction of the petition for
review or enforcement in the event the Board issues an order" if
Sears was harmed significantly by not having later-disclosed infor-
mation.45 Because of complainant Sears' unusual procedural posi-
tion in the case, the first ground would seem to be of limited im-
portance. 46  The second ground, however, seems applicable to any
case in which a party seeks to enjoin adjudicatory proceedings. In
39. 473 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1972). None of the judges who heard the case
participated in Bannercraft.
40. Id. at 92.
41. The memoranda were prepared in deciding whether to issue a complaint
against the Retail Clerk's International Union, which Sears charged with violating
section 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)
(1970). 473 F.2d at 92.
42. This position on jurisdiction correctly destroys any possibility that subse-
quent courts may rely upon the "traditional immunity of the NLRB" as a means
of distinguishing the former Sears case. See note 34 supra.
43. 473 F.2d at 93. A charging party may call, examine, and cross-examine wit-
nesses, introduce evidence into the record, submit briefs, participate in oral argument
and submit proposed findings and conclusions to the trial examiner; however, an at-
torney of the Board's regional office presents the evidence supporting the complaint.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.4, .10 (1972).
44. 473 F.2d at 92. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.10 (1972).
45. 473 F.2d at 93. The suggestion of a remedy being applied in a later deci-
sion by the Board or court of appeals raises the problems of developing standards for
determining "reversible deprivation." See note 34 supra. This case, however,
indicates the situation in which the remote possibility of harm and the likely repara-
ble nature of any harm dictate that no injunction should issue. See text accom-
panying notes 50-52 infra, for a discussion of criteria to be considered.
46. The improbability of substantial harm to Sears leaves open the possibility
that a litigant in an adjudicatory process, who could show a more substantial prob-
ability of serious injury resulting from being forced to litigate without information,
might obtain an injunction under Bannercraft.
Vol. 1973:157]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
this regard, the Sears holding is consistent with Bannercraft's empha-
sis on the unique nature of renegotiation proceedings 47 as well as
Bannercraft's insistence that no adequate statutory remedy be avail-
able48 before an injunction will issue.
Whether or not Bannercraft's application is limited to the Re-
negotiation Board, injunctions staying agency action pending FOIA
determinations could result in substantial delays of administrative
proceedings. These delays can, however, be minimized by compli-
ance with the legislative mandate to expedite FOIA claims. 49 Other
potential problems, such as the use of spurious disclosure actions
for delays, the resulting docket problems, and the administrative ex-
pense of defending numerous actions could be minimized by the use
of a multiple-factor test to determine the threshold applicability of
the Bannerdraft holding. Such a test, in part suggested by the Ban-
nercraft opinion, might include consideration of the following: the
extent of the probable delay of the administrative proceeding;60 the
effect of such a delay;5' the public interest involved;5 2 the probability
of plaintiff's success on the merits; and the importance of the re-
quested information to the protection of the complainant's rights in
the administrative proceeding. All of these factors could properly
be weighed after an in camera examination of the documents. The
utilization of this test could lead to a proper protection of the plain-
tiff's "right to know," while producing only a minimal sacrifice of
administrative efficiency and no usurpation of agency powers.
PERSONNEL RULES AND PRACTICES
Two distinct problems of statutory interpretation were pre-
sented in the 1972 cases involving the internal personnel rules and
47. See 466 F.2d at 349-51. See note 11 supra.
48. See 466 F.2d at 350-51. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
49. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970); 466 F.2d at 361. The Bannercraft
decision noted that the cases before the court were test cases and therefore had
been meticulously briefed. In order to allow such time-consuming consideration,
the contractors agreed to suspend the two year time limit on the renegotiation proc-
ess after which a contractor's liability is dismissed unless a final order has been
entered. Id. at 361 n.12. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1215(c) (Supp. 1972).
It has been strongly argued that the direction to expedite FOIA actions has
not been followed and that considerable delays have resulted. See 1972 H.R. REP.,
supra note 3, at 76; 1972 Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 5, at 1398.





practices exemption.5 3  The first problem was whether the finding
that an exemption is applicable to an agency rule of procedure circum-
vents the FOIA requirement that such a rule 4 be published before
a person can be adversely affected by it.55  In Alvarado v. Saxby, 6 the
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that an unpub-
lished army regulation 57 was subject to the exemption for internal
personnel rules,58 and then held that the regulation could be used
against the plaintiff, despite the absence of prior publication. Al-
though this holding is supported by a literal reading of the statute,59
the case law"0 and commentators, 61 it seems incongruous that a stat-
ute designed to prevent the government from using a "secret body
of law" to adversely affect individuals62 should support such a result.
The second issue concerning the internal personnel rule exemp-
tion in 1972 was whether the exemption should apply to manuals
which instruct agency personnel in techniques and procedures for the
detection of noncompliance or violations of agency rules or stat-
utes. The legislative history of the exemption is contradictory and
provides little guidance in resolving this issue. In fact, the conflict
between the House and Senate Reports on this point has been cited
53. See 5 US.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970), which exempts matters "related solely
to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency."
54. 5U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(c)-(e) (1970).
55. Id. § 552(a)(1). This provision forbids the use of unpublished rules,
statements of policy, or amendments thereto against a party unless he has "actual and
timely notice of the terms thereof. . . ." Id.
56. 337 F. Supp. 1324 (D.P.R. 1972).
57. The change was an alteration in Army Regulation 635-200, para. 6-8(b) (1),
which specified the factors a commander should consider when deciding whether to
forward a request for separation, hardship, discharge, or reassignment to the appli-
cant's State Director of Selective Service. 337 F. Supp. at 1327, n.5.
58. 337 F. Supp. at 1328.
59. The exemptions are found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), and all of the dis-
closure requirements are found in id. § 552(a). The first words of id. § 552(b) are
as follows: 'This section does not apply to matters that are [exempt] . . ." (em-
phasis added).
60. See Pfifer v. Laird, 328 F. Supp. 649 (D.D.C. 1971). The Alvarado
court quoted the following language from Pifer: "Manifestly the army's regulations
relating to discharge for conscientious objection are internal personnel matters with-
in the meaning of the ... exceptions." 337 F. Supp. at 1328, quoting 328 F.
Supp. at 652.
61. Cf. Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 417, 428, 443-44, 451 (1965); see S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 10; cf.
DAvIs § 3A.9, at 130-31 (Supp. 1970).
62. See DAViS § 3A.21, at 159 (Supp. 1970).
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as the best example of the Reports' disparity."' The House Report
adopts an interpretation of the exemption which places such manuals
squarely within the exemption,64 while the Senate Report's interpre-
tation places them totally without it.65 Predictably, the courts which
have considered the problem have reached conflicting results.
In Hawkes v. IRS, 66 the IRS was ordered to produce an Inter-
nal Revenue Service manual providing instructions to agents for
the auditing of returns; and in Stokes v. Hodgson,17 a similar man-
ual6s was ordered produced.. In both cases, the courts expressly
adopted the Senate Report's narrow interpretation of the exemp-
tion. 9  In Cuneo v. Laird,70 however, a defense contract audit
manual 71 which provides operating guidelines for investigations was
found to be exempt from disclosure under both the internal person-
nel rules and practices exemption and the intra-agency memorandum
exemption.72  The reliance upon two exemptions creates a problem
of interpretation as to whether the court held that both exemptions
protected all of the manual sought or whether parts of the manual
were included in each exemption. However, because no part of the
material sought would have been protected by the internal personnel
rules and practices exemption if the court had adopted the Senate
63. Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 150, 153-54 (1969). See 1971 Duke Project 146 n.60.
64. The House Report provides: "Matters related solely to the internal per-
sonnel rules and practices of any agency: Operating rules, guidelines, and man-
uals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners would be exempt
from disclosure. . . ." 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 10.
65. The Senate Report provides: "Exemption No. 2 relates only to the internal
personnel rules and practices of an agency. Examples of these may be rules as to
personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of
policy as to sick leave and the like." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 8.
66. 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
67. 347 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
68. At issue in Stokes was the Training Manual of the Ocupational Safety
and Health Administration, which includes "duties of compliance inspectors, the
best methods for carrying out these duties . . . [and] the proper emphasis to be
placed on different types of health and safety violations ... " 347 F. Supp. at
1373.
69. 467 F.2d at 796; 347 F. Supp. at 1374. The courts cited Benson v. GSA,
289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 415 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1969), and Consumers Union of the United States v. VA, 301 F. Supp.
796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), as decisions which accepted the interpretation suggested in
the Senate Report.
70. 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972).
71. The document involved was a 3-volume Contract Audit Manual (DCAAM-
7640.1) of the Department of Defense.
72. See notes 132-59 infra and accompanying text.
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Report's interpretation, 73 it seems likely that the court adopted, with-
out citation, the interpretation presented in the House Report. 74  This
assertion is supported by the fact that the adoption of the House
interpretation would result in exactly the type of summary decision
rendered in this case.
The authorities are divided on the question of which congres-
sional report more accurately reflects the intent of Congress.7
While the Senate Report is usually considered more authoritative, 70
the interpretation suggested in that report would render the exemp-
tion meaningless. 77  The 1972 House Committee on Government
Operations Report recommends that the exemption be amended spe-
cifically to protect "sensitive operating manuals and guidelines, the
disclosure of which would significantly impede or nullify a proper
agency function,"78 and the same recommendation was made by the
Section of Administrative Law of the ABA.79
IDENTIFIABLE RECORDS
The FOIA requires in part: "Except with respect to records
made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection,
each agency, on request for identifiable records. . . shall make the
records promptly, available to any person."80  Prior cases which
73. See note 65 supra.
74. See note 64 supra.
75. For the position that the exemption does not cover such manuals, see
DAvis § 3A.12, at 137 (Supp. 1970); Note, supra note 61, at 445. For the
opposite position, see 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 83; 1972 Hearings, supra
note 5, pt. 4, at 1436.
76. See German v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v.
David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971); DAVIS § 3A.2, at 117 (Supp.
1970).
77. See note 65 supra. It is questionable that the exemption was meant to
protect only material that few persons not employed by an agency would want,
while not protecting manuals which could be of great benefit to those who would
evade detection. The proposed amendments would no longer exempt the mundane
material covered by the Senate Report. See 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 83;
1972 Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 4, at 1436.
78. 1972 H.R. REP,., supa note 3, at 83.
79. 1972 Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 4, at 1436. The Section's report states
that such manuals sometimes include "allowable tolerances for prosecution, nego-
tiating techniques for contracting officers, schedules of surprise audits inspections,
and similar matters which cannot be disclosed without nullifying the effectiveness
of the particular agency function which they concern." Id.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) (emphasis added). The provision further
authorizes federal district courts to enjoin agencies improperly withholding agency
records.
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have dealt with this provision have been concerned with the degree
of specificity with which a request must describe the materials sought.
In Irons v. Schuyler,"' the plaintiff requested that the Commissioner
of Patents provide "all unpublished manuscript decisions of the
Patent Office."'82 The manuscript decisions that plaintiff sought
included approximately 175 volumes of bound decisionq through
1954, and all remaining decisions-now located in scattered files-
handed down since that time. 3  The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit rejected the plaintiff's assertion that only
those items not specifically ordered disclosed by sections 1 and 284
of the Act were subject to the identifiable records requirement. The
court, citing its own decision in American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gu-
lick,"5 held that the exception to the identifiable records requirement
for documents "made available" by sections 1 and 2 referred only
to documents which an agency had already "made available,"8 there-
fore making the identifiable records requirement absolute in any
enforcement action.'1 The court also held that the request made
81- - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1972).
82. The plaintiff requested both the manuscript decisions and "such indices
[of the decisions] as are available." Id. at -. The Commissioner responded that
the manuscript decisions, which are typed records of final decisions on patent ap-
plications and which are kept in the particular file of the patent request involved,
could only be assembled by searching over 3,500,000 files. Id. at -.
The request for indices was remanded with directions to the district court to
inspect in camera any indices that were available and to determine whether they
should be disclosed. Id. at
83. Id. at -.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970) provides that each agency shall publish,
in the Federal Register, its rules of procedure and substantive rules of general ap-
plicability.
Id. § 552(a)(2) commands each agency to make available to the public final
opinions, statements of policy, and administrative staff manuals.
85. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court in American Mail Line was
faced with the question of whether a memorandum, which was incorporated by
reference into a final opinion of the Maritime Subsidy Board, could be ordered
disclosed in a section 552(a)(3) action, since the memorandum was required to be
made available by section 552(a)(2). Id. at 701. The court held that an affirma-
tive decision was necessary to prevent the FOIA from creating a right without a
remedy, and found implications of this construction in the legislative history. Id.
at 701, n.8. The court admitted that there could be other equitable remedies avail-
able for failure to comply with sections 552(a) (1)-(2), but noted that an action for
such a remedy would have to meet the stringent requirements for an injunction.
Id. at 699. For a discussion of this case, see 1970 Duke Project 188.
86. 411 F.2d at 701.
87. This means, for example, that in order to obtain final opinions which an
agency refuses to publish in compliance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2), the plaintiff
must request a specific group of opinions.
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did not meet the identifiable records requirement-which had not
been rigorously enforced previously. 8
A correct analysis of Irons may turn upon the importance at-
tached to the court's failure to sever the plaintiff's request for manu-
script decisions into two parts-a request for the post-1954 decisions
now scattered through millions of files, 9 and a request for the pre-
1955 decisions gathered in 170-175 bound volumes. 90 The court
merely referred to the entire request for unpublished decisions as
"a broad, sweeping, nondiscriminate request . . . lacking any spec-
ificity."' 1  The refusal to order production of the scattered deci-
sions may easily have been prompted by the time and effort which
would have been necessary to comply; however, the FOJA's legisla-
tive history indicates that identifiability, not the difficulty of retrieval,
should be the sole criterion of availability.92 Furthermore, the bound
volumes involved were easily retrievable, yet the court refused to
order release of those decisions. 93 Thus, assuming that the court
recognized that two groups of documents were present, its refusal
to release the bound volumes lends support to the conclusion that the
rationale underlying the denial of the claim was the "unreasonable"
breadth of the request. In this regard, it is significant that the court
repeatedly stressed the factor of reasonableness, 94 implying that an
88. See Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970), where the court utilized a test of whether the agency could
tell which of its records were requested. See also Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp.
175, 177 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971)
(disorganization of agency files was held not to defeat disclosure); 1970 Duke
Project 184-86.
89. - F.2d at -. See note 82 supra.
90. - F.2d at -.
91. Id. at -.
92. See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 8; cf. id. at 2; U.S. DEP'T OF
JusIcE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PU3LIC INFORMATION SEC-
TION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 24 (1967).
93. The Irons court did remand the case for consideration of the request for
indices, and it left open the possibility of amending the request for manuscript
decisions to provide greater specificity. - F.2d at-
94. The court characterized the request as: not one for "records of a 'reason-
ably identifiable description,"' - F.2d at -; nor was it a request coming "within
a reasonable interpretation of 'identifiable records,"' id. at -; nor a request which
met the test set out in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970), of a "reasonable description enabling the Govern-
ment employee to locate the records requested." - F.2d at -, quoting 424 F.2d
at 938.
The case also leaves open the possibility that disorganization can totally defeat
an FOIA plaintiff, because the expense of collecting disorganized material will have
an independent deterrent effect. Cf. 1971 Duke Project 153 n.105. In this regard,
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FOIA request for an entire category of information will be regarded
as unreasonable-whether or not the information is easy to collect.
STATUTORY EXEMPTION
When interpreting the exemption for material specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by other statutes,95 the courts have again
received little guidance from the legislative reports." Both Con-
gressional reports merely rephrase the wording of the exemption,"T
although the less authoritative House Report98 does state that there
are "nearly one-hundred statutes or parts of statutes which restrict"
disclosure of information and which are not modified by the FOIA.0
At the time of congressional consideration of the FOIA, govern-
ment departments and agencies expressed concern that the bill could
be interpreted as an implicit repeal of existing statutes.100 While
these fears were calmed 01 by strong congressional statements to
the contrary, 02 those mollifying statements were not incorporated
in the key legislative reports. However, this portion of the legisla-
tive history which suggests the continued viability of non-disclosure
statutes 0 3 must be balanced against frequent indications that the
FOIA grew out of Congressional dissatisfaction with the agencies'
abuse of former APA section 3's grant of discretionary power to
withhold information.
The broadest non-disclosure statute which has been claimed to
qualify material for the statutory exemption is section 1905 of the
Criminal Code.'04 This act provides criminal sanctions against an
also see the table of agency fees in 1972 Hearings, note 5 supra, pt. 4, at 1245,
for production of documents (as much as $1 per page, with many agencies charging
25 cents to 50 cents per page) and for search time ($3-$5 per hour for many
agencies). The fees may become a major problem for persons who seek a large
volume of documents or poorly filed documents. 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at
10; 1972 Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 4, at 1223.
95. 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
96. See DAvis § 3A.19, at 150 (Supp. 1970).
97. 1966 H.R. RP., supra note 3, at 10; S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 9.
98. See DAvis § 3A.2, at 117 (Supp. 1970). See notes 75-77 supra and accom-
panying text.
99. 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 10.
100. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1666 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 268, 270-72 (1963).
101. See Note, supra note 61, at 453-54.
102. Hearings on S. 1666, supra note 100, at 6 (statement of Senator Edward V.
Long).
103. For a partial listing of such statutes, see STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON GOV-
ERNMENT OPERATION, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL STATUTES ON THE AvAILABILITy
OF INFORMATIoN (Comm. Print 1960).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
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officer or employee of any agency who discloses any trade secrets or
commercial and financial material to which he has gained access
through his employment, "except as provided by law." Cases prior
to 1972 have uniformly held that section 1905 does not "specifi-
cally" exempt materials from disclosure as the FOIA requires. 105 A
similar result was reached in a 1972 decision, M.A. Shapiro & Co. v.
SEC.0 6 The Shapiro court held that the statutory exemption of the
FOIA applies only to statutes which "restrict public access to specific
government records."'' 0  Shapiro and the older cases reaching this
result appear to be straining to implement the basic purpose of the
FOIA, despite the strong indication in the legislative history that
repeals by implication were not intended. 0 8 An equally effective
result was reached in California v. Richardson,0 9 but notably, by
means of a more defensible rationale. The California court simply
noted that section 1905 allows disclosure when "provided by law.""'
Reasoning that disclosures are only made when provided for in the
FOIA, the California court ruled that section 1905 is of no effect
on disclosures made pursuant to an FOIA claim."
Another broadly worded statute which restricts disclosure in a
manner radically different from section 1905 was raised as a defense
to disclosure in three 1972 cases. Section 1306 of the Social Security
Act" 2 provides that disclosure of certain broad categories of material
will not be made except as the Secretary of HEW or of Labor shall
by regulation prescribe. Section 1306 gives these Secretaries discre-
tion over release of the information obtained in all the programs
under the Social Security Act." 3 In Serchuk v. Richardson,"4 the
court stated that section 1306 was "in blatant contravention of the
liberal disclosure requirements of the [FOIA]," 1 5 and held that HEW
105. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
106. 339 F. Supp. 467, 469-70 (D.D.C. 1972).
107. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
108. See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
109. - F. Supp. - (N.D. Cal. 1972).
110. Id. at-.
111. Id.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970).
113. Id. The Act encompasses such programs as unemployment compensation,
child welfare, aid to the infirm, health insurance, Medicare, and grants to states
for various social welfare purposes.
114. - F. Supp. - (S.D. Fla. 1972).
115. Id. at-. The court also categorized § 1306 as "a blanket exclusion" which
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regulations prohibiting disclosure did not provide exemption from
the Act. Similarly, in Schecter v. Richardson,'" the court rejected
the agency's contention that section 1306 was a statute within the
meaning of the statutory exemption of the FOIA. In California v.
Richardson,1 7 however, this statute was held to satisfy the "spe-
cifically exempted from disclosure" requirement of the FOIA. These
three holdings illustrate the conflict which is also seen in the section
1905 cases: balancing the non-discretionary intent of the FOIA"8s
against legislative history which denies an intent to repeal non-dis-
closure statutes by implication. Although the distaste for discretion-
ary non-disclosure shown by Serchuk is understandable, the lan-
guage and purpose of the exemption with respect to these statutes
are reasonably clear. So long as Congress permits discretionary
non-disclosure statutes to remain on the books, the courts should al-
low agencies to utilize them. In this regard, the 1972 House Com-
mittee on Government Operations Report has specifically recom-
mended that California v. Richardson be overruled by statute"' and
that all statutes 20 similar to 1306 be reviewed.' 2 ' Until Congress
acts, however, it is submitted that section 1306 and other such dis-
cretionary non-disclosure statutes should be enforced.
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Information which can be described as "commercial" or "finan-
contravenes the requirement that exemptions are to be narrowly construed. id.
at -; cf. Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973).
116. - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1972). See California v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp.
733, 734 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
117. 351 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The materials sought were the Ex-
tended Care Facilities Reports which certify whether Medicare program require-
ments are met by different nursing homes. The suit was brought by two senior
citizens groups and the California Attorney General on behalf of the people of
the State. Id. at 734.
118. 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 9; cf. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 5-6;
DAvis § 3A.4, at 120-21 (Supp. 1970).
119. 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 85.
120. At least one other discretionary statute of similar scope gives the SEC dis-
cretionary authority over any report, etc. filed with the Commission. See 15
U.S.C. § 79v (1970). See also id. §§ 80a-44(a), 80b-10(a), which provide spe-
cific authority over reports filed by investment companies and investment advisors,
and id. § 78x (1970) which provides authority to withhold material where the
party submitting the material requests that it remain secret. This statute is cited as
an example and considered by Professor Davis to be within the exemption. DAVIS
§ 3A.18, at 146 (Supp. 1970). He rejects the argument that under such discre-
tionary statutes it is the agency head who exempts material, and not the statute. Id.
121. 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 85.
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cial" is exempted from disclosure under the FOIA if it is "obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential."' 22  Under the pre-
vailing "objective" standard of disclosure, 'only documents which
"contain commercial or financial information which the [person sub-
mitting the information] would not reveal to the public" are ex-
empt.12  However, since the underlying purpose of the exemption
is the necessity of protecting the competitive business position of the
person or enterprise submitting the information, 2 the courts have
typically ordered disclosure of information concededly financial or
commercial and submitted in confidence if sufficient deletions can be
made to protect the identity of the party submitting the informa-
tion. 2 5
In a 1972 case, Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 26 the Board had
engaged in a practice of deleting identifying materials before disclosing
the information sought. 27  In defense of this practice, the Board
contended thaf details which would identify the party submitting
any commercial or financial information disclosed are per se ex-
empt.128  In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the test for exemption was
confidentiality, and not merely whether the person who submitted
the material could be identified. The court ordered the district court
on remand to make an in camera inspection of the documents re-
quested to determine whether commercial and financial data con-
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
123. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
While this standard is more objective than a blanket exemption for anything
labelled "confidential" by the Board, the test nevertheless does require that the judge
decide whether the contractor involved would reveal the information to the public.
The answer to that subjective inquiry may depend, inter alia, upon whether the
contractor is subject to the registration and disclosure requirements of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and whether it is a cor-
poration, proprietorship, or partnership. Alternatively, a court could apply some
variation of the "reasonable man" standard-that is, would a reasonable person or
enterprise reveal this information to the public.
124. See 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 10; S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 9.
125. The practice was originally sanctioned in Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp.
v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580-88 (1970), and was used in Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FrC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970),
and, in another 1972 case, M.A. Shapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C.
1972), deletion was held to be permissible when requested by the person who gave
the information. Id. at 471.
126. 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
127. Id. at 112-13.
128. Id. at 113.
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tained therein were confidential, under the "objective" standard,
with identifying details included.129 If the district court found the
documents to be confidential, the deletions could be sustained; but
absent such a finding the district court would have to order the de-
tails disclosed.'3 0
INTRA-AGENCY MEMORANDUM EXEMPTION
The portion of the FOIA which drew the most frequent judicial
attention in 1972 was the exemption for "inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums."'' Several areas of dispute were involved,
and the issues were most frequently resolved in favor of a view of
the exemption which expanded disclosure.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co., v. NLRB,132 the District Court for the
District of Columbia held that advice and appeals memoranda pre-
pared by the NLRB's Office of General Counsel did not qualify
for the exemption. These memoranda, which provide guidance to
the NLRB Regional Director upon whether to issue complaints in
novel and significant cases,133 actually operate as mandatory in-
structions reducing the discretionary authority of the Director to a
"ministerial function.' 34  The court found that the instructions
function as "instruction to staff that affect a member of the public,"'38
-a category of information which is specifically required by the
FOIA to be disclosed.130  This resolution indicates a healthy willing-
ness on the part of the court to prevent the abuse of the inter-agency
memorandum exemption which Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC3 7 re-
fused to permit: the casting of information in memorandum form to
protect it from disclosure. 38
A similarly narrow interpretation of the exemption appeared in
several 1972 decisions which treated the distinction between facts and
129. Id. at 113.
130. Id. at 115.
131. "1Inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
* be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency"
are exempt from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970).
132. 346 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1972).
133. Id. at 753.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (c) (1970).
137. 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).




final opinion on the one hand, and elements of agency discussion
leading to decision on the other. The two prior cases which influ-
enced these courts were Soucie v. David,1 9 and Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FTC, 40 which construed the exemption narrowly and held, respec-
tively, that it protects "advice, recommendations, opinion, and other
material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes, but not
purely factual or investigatory reports" '' and only "those internal
working papers in which opinions are expressed or policies formu-
lated and recommended.' 42
In Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities,4 ' the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the documents sought clearly
fell within even the narrow interpretation of the exemption evidenced
in Soucie and Bristol-Myers. The plaintiff sought memoranda of
consultants retained by the agency which had influenced the deci-
sion to deny him a grant.' 4   The court characterized these memo-
randa as precisely the type of advice and opinion that the Soucie opin-
ion held to be protected. The most interesting aspect of the Wu case
139. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
140. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
141. 448 F.2d at 1077. Soucie also holds that factual material is not covered
by the exemption unless it is "inextricably intertwined in the policy-making proc-
ess." Accord, Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Long v.
IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972). This distinction was ignored in
Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972), where it
might have been dispositive of the issue presented, because only the appraiser's
name which had been deleted was sought.
142. 424 F.2d at 939. This position is squarely supported by the legislative
history. See 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 10, and S. REP. No. 813, supra
note 3, at 9, both of which reflect the position that effective agency performance
requires protection from disclosure of decision-making processes to protect the
frankness of discussion. Professor Davis recommends a similar construction. DAvis
§ 3A.21, at 157 (Supp. 1970).
The status of manuals instructing enforcement personnel on procedures and
criteria was considered in Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972) and
Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972). In both cases, the ma-
terials sought were found not to be exempt after an in camera inspection because
the manuals did not reveal deliberative processes that might be impeded by dis-
closure. A claim of exemption as an intra-agency memorandum was considered in
M.A. Shapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972), in which the docu-
ments sought were an SEC staff study and the material submitted during the in-
vestigation. After an in camera inspection, the court ordered disclosure after find-
ing: "None of these documents express an exchange of ideas between agencies or
their respective staff members." Id. at 470.
143. 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3447 (U.S.
Feb. 20, 1973) (No. 72-137).
144. Plaintiff sought funds to enable him to write a comprehensive history of
China. Id. at 1030-31.
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is that the court, following Soucie, extended the exemption to memo-
randa prepared by non-employees of an agency. Literally, these doc-
uments are neither "intra-agency" nor "inter-agency" memoranda;
nevertheless, the justification for the exemption-preservation of the
free interchange of ideas and opinion-dictates that such "extra-
agency" memoranda are within its scope.
In Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 45 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that the appraisal of a house by an
FH-A employee, complete with his name, was a "finished work prod-
uct" and therefore subject to disclosure. 146 Characterizing the ap-
praisal as an analysis of facts, the court found that it was not advo-
cacy of ideas and therefore was not exempt.' 47  This distinction ap-
pears valid, because the appraisal is not the position of one of a
group of persons involved in a discussion in an effort to reach a de-
cision, but is instead the final decision of one to whom the authority
to make that decision is delegated. 4 A related issue in Tennes-
sean was whether or not the name of the author of disclosed docu-
ments was exempted as an intra-agency memorandum. The court
held that an appraiser's name is a relevant and necessary part of the
appraisal which is his work product and is therefore discoverable. 4 "
The distinction between Tennessean, involving an appraisal as
a finished product and Wu, involving a consultant's opinion, is
tenuous at best.'50 The intimation in Wu that the decision was in-
fluenced by the necessity of anonymity for experts to achieve frank-
ness151 seems diametrically contrary to the result in Tennessean.
Perhaps a distinction is necessary, however, in a situation like Wu
where few objective, standardized criteria for evaluation are avail-
able, and the pool of consultants is so small that all are considered
"colleagues." The problem for future cases in this area will be to
145. 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972).
146. Id. at 660.
147. The court also cited GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969) for the
proposition that such appraisals are discoverable under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) and
therefore available to a non-agency party in litigation with an agency. 464 F.2d at
660; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
148. See 24 C.F.R. § 200.98 (1972).
149. 464 F.2d at 660; accord, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F.
Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
150. Indeed, it would be easy to cast the opinions of the consultants there as
"appraisals" of plaintiff's credentials and the merits of his project. However, the
appraisal of a house does have elements of objectivity and standardization which
are lacking in the grant application situation.
151. 460 F.2d at 1034.
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draw the lines which distinguish "work product" from "advice," and
a large group of appraisers' 52 from a small group of colleagues.153
Another question which confronted the courts in 1972 was
whether documents pertaining to a particular decision still qualified
for the intra-agency memorandum exemption after that decision had
been reached. This question was considered in Fisher v. Renego-
tiation Board, 54 where the court held that the exemption continues
unabated after a decision is reached and announced. 5 5 The Fisher
court reached its decision by distinguishing American Mail Line,
Ltd. v. Gulick' 56 as a case in which the memorandum was incorpo-
rated by reference in the final agency decision.' 57 This distinc-
tion is valid 5 s because the statutory purpose of protecting frank dis-
cussion in the decision-making processes would not be served if the
exemption ended when the decision was reached. If Fisher had
reached an opposite conclusion, indecision and/or concealment of
the fact of decision would have been rewarded. Obviously, either
result would be undesirable.'59
152. Appraiser's names will be available in the future from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. See 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 34. This
policy and the Tennessean decision are in accord with the position of the Society
of Real Estate Appraisers, the official national organization of appraisers. Id.
at 25.
153. The drawing of this line might be obviated by an amendment providing
that the advice of consultants, when requested to be kept confidential, could be
disclosed only with their names or identifying details deleted. For the operation
of a similar exemption with respect to confidential financial information, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (4) (1970), see M.A. Shapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471
(D.D.C. 1972). See notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text. Such an amend-
ment is not advisable, however, because the distinctions of objectivity and of the
role of the author in the decision-making process, see notes 148-50 supra and ac-
companying text, can be effectively utilized. Also, any legislation would either draw
an arbitrary line of exemption which would not be served in every case, or, alterna-
tively, would vest the courts with the same degree of discretion for case-by-case
analysis which they now possess under Wu and Tennessean.
154. - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1972).
155. Id. at -.
156. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Maritime Subsidy Board stated pub-
licly in a ruling on proper crew sizes that it had based its ruling on the memorandum
sought to be disclosed, and used the last pages of the memorandum as its finding
and determination. Id. at 698.
157. - F.2d at -. See 411 F.2d at 702.
158. See 1970 Duke Project 178.
159. See DAvis § 3A.21, at 159 (Supp. 1970). But see Nader, Freedom From
Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. Crv. RIGHTs-Crv. Lm. L. REv. 1,
7 (1970); 1972 Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 4, at 1156.
Perhaps the weakness of this position explains the absence of any considera.




Courts and commentators agree that the investigatory files ex-
emption °60 is intended to protect the Government's "case in court" 10 1
-that is, to prevent premature discovery of the Government's posi-
tion prior to litigation. 162 However, two divergent lines of reason-
ing have developed as to whether the exemption protects concededly
"investigatory" files when the litigation or proceedings for which the
files were prepared have terminated or have been abandoned, and
no further enforcement action is contemplated." The conflict-
which results from different interpretations of congressional intent
-and the resulting dichotomy of authority are reflected in two 1972
cases which construed the exemption.
In M.A. Shapiro & Co. v. SEC,1 64 the District Court for the
District of Columbia ordered disclosure of materials gathered during
an SEC staff study165 because it was not alleged that the materials
would be the basis for any criminal or civil action against anyone.160
Shapiro followed the 1970 decision in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC07
and implicitly adopts the conception of congressional intent adopted
in that case: the exemption was incorporated solely to prevent a
party charged with violation of a federal regulatory statute from us-
ing the FOIA to obtain information denied him by the discovery
process. 6 s This interpretation of legislative purpose compels the
conclusion that the exemption becomes inapplicable when adjudica-
which involved claims of exemption for files on which all action had been con-
cluded, and the latter of which held that the exemption was available.
160. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970) exempts "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency.$$
161. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 9.
162. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FrC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp.
708, 711-12 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp.
591, 593 (D.P.R. 1967); DAvis §§ 3A.19, at 159, 3A.23, at 164-65 (Supp. 1970).
163. For the position that the exemption is still in force, see Evans v. DOT,
446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972). For the contrary
position, see Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
164. 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
165. The relevant materials were the "Commission's Staff Study on the off-board
trading problem raised by the New York Stock Exchange's original rule 394; and all
transcripts made and documents received by the ... Commission in the course
of that investigation." Id. at 468-69.
166. Id. at 470.
167. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
168. 424 F.2d at 939.
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tory proceedings are not imminent."6 9 Although the Shapiro opinion
contains dictum which could produce anomalous results,7 ° the ap-
proach of the court nonetheless provides a clear test for the applica-
tion of the exemption: if proceedings are "imminent," all of the rel-
evant investigatory material is protected; if proceedings are not "im-
minent," none of the material is protected.
In contrast to Shapiro, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in Frankel v. SEC, 17' held that the exemption extended beyond
the conclusion of all relevant proceedings. In Frankel, shareholders
of a corporation were refused an order for disclosure of information
collected in a prior SEC action against the corporation. Frankel
joins a 1971 Fifth Circuit case, Evans v. DOT,12 in rejecting the
view that the exemption was intended solely to prevent FOIA use by
potential litigants.'Y3 An additional purpose for the exemption-
protecting the confidentiality of both agency investigatory procedures
and the identity of those who provide information-was recognized
in Frankel. 1 4  In effecting this additional policy, the Frankel court
169. This is the holding of Bristol-Myers.
170. Since the investigation involved had been concluded six years before the
decision, 339 F. Supp. at 470, the court's implication that the exemption may still
have been available upon a showing that an enforcement proceeding was "immi-
nent" is disturbing. This dictum could mean that an action for production of
these documents brought in one year would be successful if a proceeding which
would use the documents was not then imminent, while the very same action, if
brought in a later year, would fail if use of the documents subsequently becameimminent. Hence, an anomalous situation develops because material which was
once disclosable, and possibly widely distributed, may later become "private," and
therefore exempt from disclosure.
171. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 125 (1972).
172. 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
173. 460 F.2d at 817. See 446 F.2d at 824.
174. 460 F.2d at 817. The court quotes legislative history which does not sup-
port this secondary purpose at all, but which is the source of the interpretation
adopted in Bristol-Myers. The court quotes the following statements:
Exemption No. 7 deals with 'investigatory files compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes.' These are the files prepared by Government agencies to
prosecute law violators. The disclosure of such files, except to the extent
available by law to a private party, could harm the Government's case in
court. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 9 (emphasis added).
This exemption covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all
kinds of laws, labor and securities laws as well as criminal laws. This
would include files prepared in connection with related Government litiga-
tion and adjudicative proceedings. S1160 is not intended to give a private
party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he
would have directly in such litigation or proceedings. 1966 H.R. RP.,
supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added).
The court also quotes one sentence from the introductory portion of the Senate
Report which conceivably could support its position:
It is also necessary for the very operation of our Government to allow it
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indicated that the plaintiff should be denied any FOIA disclosure
order which would affect any material within an investigatory file. rh
Thus, the Frankel court's test is as lucid as that of courts following
Bristol-Myers: if the material is within an investigatory file, it is ex-
empt from FOTA disclosure both before and after any enforcement
proceedings. Accepting, arguendo, the additional purpose advanced
in Frankel, the technique utilized to advance this purpose-permanent
extension of the exemption-lacks merit. If litigation is complete or
no longer imminent, the Government's "case in court" no longer needs
protection; therefore, the continuing existence of the exemption should
be limited to provide only for protection of the witnesses' identity
and the investigatory techniques. 176 The remaining factual informa-
tion in the file could be disclosed without contravening either pur-
pose.177
The continuing protection of identities and investigatory tech-
niques could also be achieved under the Bristol-Myers rationale if
another exemption or common law privilege could be utilized to pre-
vent disclosure.'18 Three possibilities suggest themselves: the stat-
utory exemption;"79 the trade secrets and confidential information
to keep confidential certain material, such as the investigatory files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 3, at 3.
A less strained reading of this sentence casts no light on the additional purpose
controversy. The issue as to investigatory techniques may have been mooted by
such de.cisions as Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972), and Stokes v.
Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972), which give access to the manuals
used to instruct agency employees in such techniques. See note 142 supra.
175. 460 F.2d at 817-18.
176. Overly broad protection would violate the spirit if not the letter of 5
U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970): "This section does not authorize withholding of informa-
tion or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in
this section." See 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 1.
177. An approach which could modify the Bristol-Myers interpretation to allow
partial exemption after all enforcement proceedings have ended, was adopted in
Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1973), in which
the court implied that the prospect of serious harm to agency efficiency might allow
continuing application of the exemption. Cf. Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
As a minimum protective measure, the court could have required the district
court to make an in camera inspection of the materials requested in order to release
the now unprotected material. Although the plaintiff admittedly sought material
which appears to be investigatory by definition, see text accompanying note 172
supra, the Bristol-Myers court and commentators have stated that such an inspection
is necessary to prevent abusive use of the investigatory files exemption. See
424 F.2d at 938-39; 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93, 104 (1972). See generally
Nader, supra note 159.
178. See 1971 Duke Project 158.
179. 5 U.S.C.§ 552(b)(3) (1970).
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exemption;180 and the "informant privilege." 181  The statutory ex-
emption could serve this function only if there were either a single
statute protecting identities for all agencies or a multitude of statutes
which collectively cover each agency completely. Neither of these
conditions yet exist.' The trade secret and confidential informa-
tion exemption cannot protect all informants and witnesses unless it
is construed to protect confidential information which is neither com-
mercial nor financial, and it is unlikely that it will be consistently
so construed. 183  The "informant's privilege" has not yet been ap-
plied as such in an FOIA action, but it is not necessarily inapplicable;
the traditional concept of "informant,' 8 4 however, would have to be
strained to include all witnesses in agency investigations, and it is
not at all clear that the privilege is applicable to a situation in which
the requesting party is not being prosecuted.-8 5
In view of the weakness of these alternative grounds for exclu-
sion, the goal of limiting post-litigation protection to witnesses' and
informants' identities might be achieved only by a construction
which makes the exemption generally unavailable after proceedings
have terminated but yet allows the continued selective exemption of
portions of files. The weakness of Evans and Frankel is that in
achieving continued protection of the sensitive portions of the file
they require suppression of the entire file. Achieving selective ex-
emption, however, requires strained statutory construction: the ex-
emption for "files" must be read as "portions of files," or "mate-
rials." Obviously, the most direct method of achieving such a con-
180. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
181. The informant privilege is the limited privilege of the Government in cer-
tain circumstances to withhold the identity of those who provide information of
violations of law. It exists in recognition of the duty of citizens to provide their
knowledge of crimes to law enforcement officials. See Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
182. See STAFF OF Housa COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 86TH CONG.,
2D SESS., FEDERAL STATUTES ON THE AvAILABILITY OF INFORMATION (Comm. Print
1960). A typical exemption provision is contained in the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970) which was construed in Evans v. DOT, 446
F.2d 821, 823 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
183. See DAvis § 3A.19, at 149-50 (Supp. 1970).
184. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
185. In view of the FOIA's language that disclosure be made available to "any
person," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), the exemption cannot be construed to pre-
vent only potential defendants from gaining access to information. DAvis § 3A.4
at 120 (Supp. 1970).
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struction is statutory amendment, 180 but the inertia of the legislative
process and the failure of the 1972 Report by the House Committee
on Government Operations to recommend that such a change be
made'87 suggest that the exemption will not be amended in the near
future.
The conflict between the two concepts of congressional intent
and the resulting statutory constructions cannot be resolved by ref-
erence to the legislative history of the exemption. 188 The weight of
sound policy, however, requires that there be some exemption to pro-
tect the identity of those who supply information vital to investiga-
tion both before and after the termination of proceedings. 8 Since
an amendment protecting informants and witnesses is probably notimminent, and, arguably, no other exemption or privilege as cur-
rently defined protects such sources, the investigatory files exemp-
tion should not be construed to lapse at the end of proceedings.
But in extending the exemption past the point of proceedings, the
courts should review files in camera and order disclosure of all mate-
186. Amendments of this type were proposed by representatives of three different
organizations and are contained in 1972 Hearings, supra note 5. See id. pt. 4, at
1156 (statement of David Parson, Chairman, Committee on Government Informa-
tion, Federal Bar Association); id., pt. 5, at 1436 (statement of the Section of
Administrative Law of the American Bar Association, Milton M. Carrow, Chair-
man); id., pt. 6, at 2235 (statement of Sanford Jay Rosen, Assistant Legal Di-
rector, American Civil Liberties Union).
187. See 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 84. After making specific recom-
mendations as to changes that should be made, the Report adds:
It could also be amended . . . to make clear that once an investigatory
record becomes public information, informants' names or identities or
such information which would necessarily lead to the identification of such
informant may continue to be withheld .... Id.
This statement rejects the possible construction that the committee's proposed
amendment, changing "files" to "records," would, by breaking the protective "shell"
of the file evidenced in Frankel, provide the authority for courts to eliminate all
but witnesses' and informants' identification from the exemption protection upon in
camera review.
188. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
See note 174 supra. For the propositions that these reports represent the useful
legislative history and that the Senate Report is to be considered authoritative, see
DAVIs § 3A.2, at 116-17 (Supp. 1970). One author finds support in the congres-
sional floor debates for the position taken in Evans and Frankel, but the portions
upon which the author relied supply no such support. See 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
93, 101, n.68 (1972).
189. 460 F.2d at 817-18; Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D. Md. 1970), afl'd on other grounds,
444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); 1971 Duke Project 158 n.129; 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
93, 103 (1972). This is the same type of problem considered by the court in a
non-enforcement context in Wu. See text accompanying note 143 supra.
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rials therein which will not divulge the identities of sources. Any
other construction would protect material for which no protection is
needed or provided by the FOTA.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE CORRECT AGENCY
In at least two FOIA cases, courts have refused to order dis-
closure of "identifiable records" even if they were not protected
by any exemption. In Nichols v. United States,'90 a physician
sought medical records related to the autopsy of President Kennedy.
In an action for disclosure under the FOIA, the court refused to
grant an order, holding that the material was exempted from dis-
closure by statute. 9' The most disturbing element of the deci-
sion is the court's acceptance of a sworn statement by the Navy that
it no longer had the material in its custody as dispositive of the re-
quest for those items.' 92 The Nichols decision is similar to that in
Skolnick v. Kerner, 93 a 1970 case in which a request for a report
was dismissed because the commission which had prepared the re-
port had been disbanded. 94  The Skolnick court ignored the possi-
bility that another agency might have possession of the report, and
that the plaintiff might be incapable of identifying the successor.
Similarly, the Nichols court ignored the high probability that the
items sought in that case were preserved elsewhere within the fed-
eral bureaucracy. These decisions refuse to place the burden of
finding the requested materials upon the government when the
plaintiff seeks disclosure from the agency (1) which admits it once had
them, (2) which is the most likely agency to possess them, and (3)
whose records should show to whom the materials were transferred.
Thus, the decisions place the tremendous burden upon the plaintiff
of determining which agency has the documents before filing suit.
An opposite result in these cases-compelling the defendant
agency (or its successor in interest) to disclose the current cus-
todian of the material, or at least the identity of the agency to which
it passed from the defendant' 95 -would obviously further the dis-
190. - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1972).
191. Id. at -.
192. Id. at -.
193. 435 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1970), noted in 1970 Duke Project 192.
194. Id. at 695.
195. Such an order could be premised upon the jurisdiction to grant orders com-
pelling disclosure given to district courts by the FOIA, or upon the traditional
equitable powers of the federal courts. Compare Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Re-
negotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W.
Vol. 1973:1571
206 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1973:157
closure of non-exempt information. Furthermore, unless some such
method is developed to shift the onerous burden 10 that these deci-
sions place upon plaintiffs, the only course open to them may be to
name as parties-defendant in the original action every conceivable
agency which might possess the material, forcing each to disavow
possession in order to have the case against it dismissed.
3409 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973) (No. 72-822). See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying
text.
At the time of the FOIA's passage, the Department of Justice recognized the
difficulty individuals might encounter in addressing their requests to the proper
agency. Consequently, the Department instructed that agencies refer requests to the
proper agency, See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE ATroRNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM,
supra note 92, at 24.
196. A sample of the type of actual problems generated by documents passed
between agencies is given in 1972 H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 26.
